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An Argument for Terrorism 
By Richard Jackson [1] 
 
It has become something of a cliché to note that there are over 200 definitions of terrorism in 
existence within broader terrorism studies literature; that many terrorism scholars have given 
up on the definitional debate and use the term unreflectively; and that such a state of affairs 
hampers theoretical progress and skews terrorism research in unhelpful ways. However, the 
significance and consequences of the definitional debate go far beyond such narrow academic 
confines, important as they are to the field. Rather, the issue of definition is central to the way 
in which the Global War on Terror is prosecuted by the authorities both domestically and  
overseas. It also affects the way in which terrorism is understood and dealt with as a criminal 
act under international and domestic law. In the academic and cultural realms, the definition 
of terrorism has important implications for the way knowledge and commonsense about the 
subject is constructed and reproduced socially. Furthermore, it has substantial indirect 
consequences for individuals and groups labelled as terrorists – who may then be legally 
subject to torture, rendition and internment without trial – and for the ―suspect communities‖ 
they belong to. 
 
This paper argues that despite a number of serious political and ontological obstacles to the 
definition of terrorism, it should be possible to agree on a clear set of criteria that can be 
employed to distinguish and conceptualise terrorism as a unique form of political violence. 
There are a great many advantages to adopting these definitional criteria. More importantly, 
there are political-normative imperatives for retaining ―terrorism‖ as a central organising 
concept for the field. The paper begins by discussing some of the main challenges in defining 
terrorism and the kinds of knowledge practices this has resulted in to date. The second section 
outlines a set of criteria that analysts can employ to distinguish terrorism from other forms of 
political violence. The final section of the paper attempts to demonstrate how this approach to 
terrorism can play a role in strengthening rules and norms against illegitimate and oppressive 
forms of political violence, whether it is committed by state or nonstate actors. 
 
 
The Constitution of Terrorism 
 
I have already noted that the definitional debate in terrorism studies has reached something of 
a stalemate. Not only is there no agreed definition among scholars, but an analysis of 490 
articles published in the leading terrorism studies journals between 1990 and 1999 revealed 
that only eight, or 1.6 percent of them, could be regarded as conceptually-oriented papers. [2] 
This suggests that many scholars have largely given up on the challenging theoretical debates 
surrounding the central concept of the field. An examination of broader terrorism studies 
literature suggests four main approaches and practices towards the definition and 
conceptualisation of terrorism.[3] Arguably the most frequent practice—particularly amongst 
scholars who are newly arrived to the subject—is to simply use the term without defining it, 
on the misguided assumption that it is widely understood and accepted. Such an approach is 
problematic for a number of very obvious reasons, not least because terrorism is a highly 
emotive and divisive concept which different scholars and societies have often understood in 
very different ways. 
 
A second approach, confined mainly to political leaders and security officials, but also to a 
surprising number of researchers and media pundits, is to define terrorism as an ideology or 
movement. Although groups specializing solely in terror do sometimes form, they are 
extremely rare and typically remain highly unstable and ephemeral. There are very few such 
groups operating today. In reality, most terrorism occurs in the context of wider political 
struggles in which the use of terror is one strategy among other more routine forms of 
contentious action.[4] As Charles Tilly puts it, ―Properly understood, terror is a strategy, not a 
creed. Terrorists range across a wide spectrum of organizations, circumstances, and 
beliefs.‖[5] 
 
Third, it is not uncommon to see researchers adopt an actor-based definition in the literature, 
whereby terrorism is defined as a particular form of political violence committed by non-state 
actors who attack civilians. Bruce Hoffman, for example, argues that terrorism involves 
violence ―perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity.‖[6] This is in keeping with 
the U.S. State Department‘s highly influential definition of terrorism, which conceives of 
terrorism as ―premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against non-combatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an 
audience.‖[7] For scholars who adopt this definition, terrorism is largely indistinguishable 
from insurgency, militancy, guerrilla warfare and the like. More importantly, inherent to this 
approach is an assumption that while states may commit atrocities, engage in political 
repression or torture opponents, this nonetheless does not constitute terrorism, in large part 
because states have the sovereign right to use force. [8] From this perspective, definitions of 
terrorism hinge on questions of legitimacy and sovereignty and the nature of the actor who 
employs the violence. As I will argue below, actor-based approaches to the definition of 
terrorism are both analytically untenable and politically suspect. 
 
Lastly, and most commonly among the leading scholars in the field, terrorism is defined as a 
violent strategy or tactic that actors employ in pursuit of particular political goals. That is, 
terrorism is defined and understood by the nature and characteristics of the act itself, rather 
than the nature of actor, and is conceived as a particular kind of political action directed 
towards certain strategic goals rather than as a broad ideology or movement. Louise 
Richardson for example, defines terrorism as ―politically motivated violence directed against 
non combatants or symbolic targets which is designed to communicate a message to a 
broader audience.‖[9] Crucially, such a definitional approach accepts that states are also 
actors who can and frequently do adopt strategies of terrorism and commit terrorist acts. This 
is a useful formulation that provides the basis for the identifying criteria I present below. 
 
Partly due to these definitional approaches, research on terrorism in the broader field has 
been characterised by a number of unfortunate tendencies. An initial tendency widely noted 
by some critics of the field is the selection bias of much terrorism research. In this case, the 
terrorism label is applied almost solely to non-state groups opposed to Western interests. It is 
usually not applied to those groups supported by Western states – even when they commit 
identical acts of civilian-directed violence such as hijackings, bombings, kidnappings and 
assassinations.[10] Thus, while left-wing groups have always received an inordinate amount 
of attention in terrorism studies literature, right-wing groups like the Contras, anti-Castro 
groups, US- and South African supported movements in Angola and Mozambique, various 
Afghan factions, numerous Latin American death squads, and today a number of Iraqi death 
squads, have remained scandalously understudied. Although this is in part the result of the 
definitional practices noted above, it is also the result of an understandable but avoidable 
ideological bias amongst many Western scholars who adopt the interests of their own 
governments. 
 
A more serious issue is that the field has been widely criticised for its failure to provide 
sustained analysis (and moral condemnation) of state terrorism. Indicative of the almost 
exclusive focus on ―terrorism from below‖ as opposed to ―terrorism from above‖ is the 
finding that only 12, or less than two percent, of articles from 1990 to 1999 in the core 
terrorism studies journals focused on state terrorism,[ 11] and that only 12 of the 768 pages in 
the Encyclopaedia of World Terrorism (1997) examined state terrorism in any form.[12] In 
part, this is due to the not infrequent practice noted above of defining terrorism exclusively as 
a form of non-state violence. 
 
However, there are also many prominent scholars who accept that, objectively, terrorism is a 
strategy of political violence that any actor can employ, including states, yet simply refuse to 
examine cases of state terrorism in their research. Walter Laqueur, arguably one of the 
founders of terrorism studies, is emblematic of this practice: he openly accepts that states 
have killed many more people and caused far more material and social destruction than 
―terrorism from below‖, but then argues that this is simply not the type of terrorism he wishes 
to examine.[13] It is perfectly understandable that scholars would wish to focus on particular 
subjects, but when an entire field neglects what is a very important dimension of the 
phenomenon, it raises troubling questions about the ideological orientation and political 
objectivity of the overall field. 
 
Clearly, there are reasons for concern over this state of affairs. From a political-normative 
perspective, the field appears biased towards Western state interests and complicit in the 
terroristic practices Western states have regularly employed over the past two hundred 
years.[14] The well-documented use of political terror by Western states during the colonial 
period, the ―terror bombing‖ during World War II and other conflicts, cold war counter-
insurgency and pro-insurgency campaigns, the active sponsorship of right-wing non-state 
terrorist groups and the widespread use of torture during certain counter-terrorism campaigns, 
among others, are only the most prominent examples of the kind of terrorism that many 
Western states have employed. The failure to analyse state terrorism or to condemn it in the 
same morally assured terms as non-state terrorism appears to many observers as pro-Western 
bias and a toleration of certain forms of state-practiced terrorism. [15] 
 
In addition, it represents a breakdown of scholarly procedure and a self-imposed intellectual 
blindness. It is intellectually unsustainable to argue that states cannot practice terrorism 
against their own people and against other states. For example, such an approach would argue 
that a car bomb detonated on a city street by clandestine state agents is not an act of 
terrorism, but an identical attack by non-state actors is. Or that the kidnap, torture and murder 
of a civilian by agents of the state are not terrorist acts, but the same act by a non-state group 
is terrorism. Accepting that terrorism can only really be described according to the nature and 
quality of the particular act of violence—rather than the purported legitimacy of the actor 
who commits it [16]—has a number of serious consequences and implications. 
 
In the first place, the acceptance that states are not exempted from employing terrorism raises 
serious questions about the broader focus of the field and the empirical foundations it is based 
on. That is, while non-state terrorists have killed tens of thousands and caused significant 
damage during the past century and a half, the acceptance that ―states can be terrorists, too‖ 
[17] reveals that some individual states have been responsible for more terrorism than all 
non-state terrorist groups put together. A conservative estimate of state-instigated mass 
murder, forcible starvations and genocide against civilians for example, suggests that 
governments have been responsible for 170-200 millions deaths in the twentieth century 
alone. [18] Even if only a small proportion of these deaths can be strictly defined as state 
terrorism, the few hundred deaths caused every year by non-state terrorists pales beside the 
massive death, destruction and de-stabilisation caused by some states. Moreover, a great 
many states continue to employ terrorism on a considerable scale against their people today 
in places like Colombia, Haiti, Algeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Pakistan, Uzbekistan,[19] 
Egypt, Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Tibet, North Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
elsewhere. And yet, the broader terrorism studies field does not include statistics on state 
terrorism in any of its recognised databases, nor does it expend any real effort trying to 
understand the nature, causes, strategies and outcomes of state terrorism. [20] 
 
A serious analytical breakdown occurs when an entire field largely fails to examine what is 
arguably the most serious aspect of the subject. It would be comparable to an imaginary 
situation in which criminologists focused most of their research on anti-social behaviour and 
burglaries, and failed to study in any systematic way the extent and causes of domestic 
violence, rape, murder, sexual abuse or other serious crimes. 
 
Another important consequence of accepting state terrorism as ―terrorism‖ (and not just 
―repression‖) is the need to re-conceptualise some of the accepted truisms in the field 
regarding the nature of terrorist behaviour. It is not the case for example, that terrorism is 
solely the ‗weapon of the weak‘; it can also be true that ―the stronger the state, the stronger 
the temptation to rule through a regime of terror‖. [21] In fact, an objective look at the history 
of terrorism would suggest that strong actors have used terror far more frequently than weak 
ones. Moreover, it is clear that contrary to popular beliefs, terrorism can be employed during 
war as well as during peace. For example, when states bomb civilian targets of no military 
value for the sole purpose of terrorising a population into surrender—a case of frightening 
one group of people in order to produce a political change in another—they are clearly 
committing a terrorist act. [22] Similarly, counter-terrorism itself can become terrorism under 
certain conditions: 
 
When it fails to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty; 
When it is highly disproportionate; 
When it aims to terrify or intimidate the wider population or a particular community 
into submission; 
When it is co-opted to serve a political agenda. [23] 
 
Ultimately, there are important ethical-normative implications for the notion that states 
employ terrorism too, often under the guise of ―counter-terrorism‖. In the current climate, 
virtually every state and international organisation has adopted new anti-terrorism legislation, 
and military force—including ―strategic bombing‖—is frequently being used as a tool of 
counter-terrorism. At the very least, scholars should be highly suspicious of any and all 
attempts by states to define terrorism in ways that conveniently absolve what they or their 
agents do from being considered terrorism. They should refuse to accede to the common 
practice of exempting state officials from charges of terrorism, if for no other reason than 
that: 
 
There is something morally suspicious, however, about people making laws that apply 
to everyone else accept [sic] themselves. The sheer fact that politicians have entered 
into a mutual-protection pact not to prosecute one another as ‗terrorists‘ cannot 
change any logical or deontological facts of the matter. If what they do is otherwise 
indistinguishable from what is done by non-state actors that we would deem to be 
terroristic, then the acts of the state officials doing the same thing would be morally 
wrong for just the same reasons.[24] 
 
It is not as if there understandable reasons exist for the continuing failure to agree upon a 
definition of the field‘s central concept. In the first place, some of the key concepts at the 
heart of the definition of terrorism are extremely subjective and difficult to determine 
objectively. Most definitions of terrorism by leading scholars for example, describe it as a 
form of illegitimate violence directed towards innocent civilians that is intended to intimidate 
or terrify an audience for political purposes. The question of what makes an act of violence 
legitimate or not, who is considered a civilian, how innocence can be measured, what the real 
intentions of often clandestine actors might be and what counts as a political aim, are all 
highly contested and subject to competing claims. As a consequence, in practice it is often the 
politically and culturally determined legitimacy of the particular group under scrutiny that 
determines whether its actions are labelled as ―terrorism‖ and not necessarily the 
characteristics inherent to the violence itself. 
 
Much more significantly however, terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing 
phenomenon which can be defined in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself. It 
lacks a clear ontological status—which actually makes an objective definition impossible. As 
two leading figures in the field put it, ―The nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent 
act itself. One and the same act… can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and 
circumstance‖. [25] The bombing of civilians for example, is not always or inherently a 
terrorist act; it may be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. 
 
The reality is that terrorism is a social fact rather than a brute fact. Although acts of violence 
are experienced as brute facts, the wider cultural-political meaning of those acts as 
―terrorism‖ for example, is decided through symbolic labelling, social agreement and a range 
of inter-subjective practices. That is, as a phenomenon, terrorism is constituted by and 
through the discursive practices which make it a concrete reality for politicians, law 
enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics and so on. We can identify a number 
of processes by which certain acts and individuals are constructed as ―terrorism‖ and 
―terrorists‖, including:  
 
• The labelling of certain acts and groups as such by authoritative actors, such as the 
annual State Department reports; 
• The legal definitions contained within criminal and international law; 
• The compiling of statistics on terrorism by the CIA, RAND, and various academics 
and think-tanks; and 
• The ascriptions of different groups and acts as ―terrorist‖ in the media. 
 
Actions and actors are constituted and reconstituted as terrorism in a continuous flow of 
social and political discourse. Moreover, analyses of these discourses reveal significant 
variation and instabilities between and within institutions, as well as shifts over time in the 
way terrorism is discursively constructed and delineated.[26] For example, before the late 
1960s, there was virtually no ―terrorism‖ spoken of by politicians, the media or academics; 
there were instead numerous references to ―bombings‖, ―kidnappings‖, ―assassinations‖, 
―hijackings‖ and so on.[ 27] The current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians 
and the media is in fact, a very recent invention. Similarly, in the 1980s, the Afghan 
Mujahidin were described as ―freedom fighters‖ [28] before they were later reconstructed as 
―Islamic terrorists‖. Numerous other groups and states have experienced the same kind of 
discursive transformation from ―terrorist‖ or ―state-sponsor of terrorism‖ to ―freedom 
fighter‖, ―political leader‖ or ―ally in the War on Terror‖. 
 
In an important sense, terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices that 
seek to enclose it. In the same way that ―races‖ do not exist objectively as a meaningful way 
of assigning identities and behavioural characteristics to individuals, but classifications of 
humankind do, so too ―terrorism‖ does not exist as a kind of essential marker—even if 
classifications of different forms of political violence do.[29] A pertinent illustration of the 
ontological instability of the terrorism label is the observation that there are no less than four 
recognised ―terrorists‖ who have gone on to win the Nobel Peace Prize: Menachim Begin, 
Sean McBride, Nelson Mandela and Yassir Arafat.[30] In other words, even within the 
confines of contemporary terrorism discourse, ―once a terrorist, is not always a terrorist‖.[31] 
It depends upon the current political context and the dominant discourses which determine 
and constitute it. 
 
It is for this reason, among others, that some scholars argue that the term should be avoided 
or eschewed altogether in academic research. These scholars suggest that the appropriate 
focus of study is not the terrorism that exists out there ―in reality‖, but the discourses of 
terrorism and the discursive practices that construct terrorism as a political and cultural 
subject. [32] Another set of scholars argue more prosaically that terrorism is a political-
cultural label and an act of de-legitimisation, and that no group ever accepts its designation as 
―terrorist‖. They suggest that as a concept, ―terrorism‖ has been greatly abused by political 
interests and has too many negative cultural and political connotations to retain any real 
analytical value. While these are cogent and challenging arguments, I do not accept that this 
means we should abandon the attempt to carefully and consistently determine which acts 
should be considered terrorist, or that we cannot agree on a set of fairly clear identifying 
criteria which can be employed for research purposes. 
 
 
An Argument for Terrorism 
 
It is my argument here that in spite of its insecure ontological status, its negative cultural-
political baggage and its frequent misuse by political and academic actors, there are a number 
of important political and normative reasons for retaining the term ―terrorism‖ as an 
organising concept for the field. I want to further suggest that the term can serve a useful 
function within a broader progressive political project to restrict and eliminate the use of 
certain kinds of illegitimate and oppressive forms of political violence. However, in order to 
achieve these lofty goals, scholars need to adopt the aims and commitments of a more 
‗critical‘ approach to terrorism. 
 
Politically, there are a number of reasons why we should retain the term ―terrorism‖ and 
engage in sustained and rigorous discursive struggle over its constitution and knowledge 
production. Most obviously, the term now has widespread political and cultural currency. It is 
the organising concept for a vast array of powerful political institutions, processes and 
practices in contemporary society, and scholars who refuse to employ or engage with it risk 
marginalising their views and their access to power. The term also clearly retains a great deal 
of academic currency. There is now a whole field of research, teaching and advocacy 
surrounding the concept of terrorism, with numerous journals, conferences, teaching 
programmes, think-tanks, research centres, funding opportunities and advisory posts in 
existence. To refuse to employ the term or engage in debates about its definition and 
application in research is again, to risk marginalisation and irrelevance within this broader 
scholarly context. 
 
Most importantly however, there is a compelling normative imperative to retain a term that 
de-legitimises particular kinds of violence directed against civilians and which 
instrumentalises human suffering for the purposes of influencing an audience. [33] Of course, 
the normative power of the terrorism label is highly dependent upon its consistent application 
to all qualifying cases, including cases involving Western states or their allies. The selectivity 
and bias of terrorism scholars and political leaders in the past has seriously undermined this 
project by making it appear that the term is reserved solely for enemies of the West. 
However, I would argue that this provides a reason for critical engagement rather than 
withdrawal and capitulation in the discursive struggle. 
 
Although terrorism can never be adequately defined due to its unstable ontological status, I 
want to argue that it can, and should, be described according to a set of identifiable and 
unique characteristics, which delineate it from other forms of political violence. Furthermore, 
a review of broader terrorism studies literature would suggest that the following conception 
of terrorism has broad support from many leading scholars in the field and could form the 
basis of a consensus over how to conceptualise it. Such an approach moreover, has several 
advantages over most of the existing approaches I outlined above. I suggest that as a form of 
political violence, terrorism can be described according to four main characteristics. 
 
First, terrorism is an intentional and pre-determined strategy of political violence. This 
suggests its rational and instrumental basis. It also implies that any actor (states, groups or 
individuals) can employ it in pursuit of strategic goals. More importantly, it implies that 
actors can abandon its use at any time, and that being a ―terrorist‖ is not a determinant of 
future behaviour or an indication of some kind of essential ―evil‖ nature. ―Terrorists‖ can 
choose to adopt non-violent strategies instead; they can even become statesmen and 
peacemakers. Importantly, it also implies political motivations, as a way of distinguishing 
terrorism from other forms of violence designed to terrify, such as the intimidation of 
communities by organised criminals seeking to obtain financial reward, the terror caused by a 
serial killer, or the fear caused by a one-off mass killing. Lastly, it implies forethought and 
intentionality, as opposed to the terror induced by rioting or communal disturbances, for 
example. 
 
Second, the targets of terrorist violence are not necessarily the victims of the violence, but 
rather the audiences to the violence. From this perspective, terrorism is a form of political 
communication rather than direct military action. An important distinction here is that 
terrorism instrumentalises its victims. Unlike the actions of soldiers in war who seek to 
directly degrade the material ability of the enemy to continue fighting, the victims of 
terrorism are chosen instead for symbolic reasons. An important point here is that states 
which try to hide their involvement in civilian-directed violence may still be sending a 
powerful message to the society or social groups they wish to intimidate. The use of 
disappearances as a strategy of terrorism for example, sends a message that the state is 
omnipotent, omnipresent and ruthless in rooting out opponents, [34] as does kidnap and 
torture. In other cases, state terrorism may be both instrumental and direct: killing a union 
organiser for example, both weakens the union and sends a message to potential union 
leaders and the society they come from. 
Third, and related to the previous point, terrorism is intended to cause fear and intimidate. 
This is the central purpose of the violence and not just the unintended consequence, although 
it can be argued that there is a certain kind of intentionality when actors engage in actions 
they can be sure which will cause terror and intimidate, such as using airpower to bomb 
civilian areas. Moreover, the intention to cause fear can usually be deduced from the targets, 
context and foreseen consequences of the violence. Bombs in public places or the widespread 
use of torture against regime opponents for example, are clearly intended to terrify the wider 
society. 
 
Lastly, terrorism is aimed primarily but not solely at civilians. Here I differ with some 
scholars in that I argue that it is often unhelpful to try and maintain civilian-military or 
combatant-non-combatant distinctions in conceptualising terrorism. I agree with Goodin in 
this regard that such distinctions can in fact, be counterproductive, as they allow actors to 
claim legitimacy for other forms of equally abhorrent violence. [35] A violent campaign 
aimed at police officers or off-duty military personnel that was intended to cause fear and 
intimidate the wider society or a certain section of society for example, would still constitute 
terrorism even though it avoided targeting civilians. Similarly, certain actions during war 
which were aimed solely at terrorising enemy soldiers and their civilian audience, rather than 
for military-strategic reasons, could also be considered terrorism. The use of certain types of 
militarily ineffective but demoralising chemical weapons or the bombing of civilian areas in 
which there were no real strategic targets, for example, would qualify as terrorism. 
 
There are a number of clear advantages to employing such a conception of terrorism. In the 
first instance, it does not artificially and illogically limit the phenomenon by the nature of the 
actor (as some definitions do), but includes state terrorism, gender-based terrorism, [36] and 
non-state terrorism. Second, it does not limit the analysis to peace, but also includes the 
behaviour of actors in war—the site of a great deal of concentrated political violence. Lastly, 
as mentioned, it can be argued that there is already a consensus on these criteria among the 
leading terrorism scholars, as their definitions tend to incorporate all these elements. From 
this perspective, the main issue is not that we do not know what terrorism is or that we cannot 
clearly identify it; it is rather that the application of the definition is too often restricted—for 
whatever reason—to a narrow set of actors that most often happens to coincide with the 
current strategic interests of Western powers. During the cold war, most terrorism research 
focused on left-wing non-state groups; today, most terrorism research focuses on so-called 
―Islamist terrorism‖. This inconsistent application both distorts the focus of the field and 
undermines attempts to restrict and eliminate oppressive forms of political violence. 
 
 
Terrorism and Emancipation 
 
In addition to its analytical advantages, the terrorism label could be employed as means to 
advancing a progressive political project aimed at protecting marginalised and vulnerable 
populations from indiscriminate and oppressive forms of violence. That is, at the most basic 
level, employing the above criteria can have the effect of de-legitimising any and all forms of 
violence that seek to instrumentalise human suffering for the sole purpose of sending a 
message to an audience. Related to this, it also de-legitimises all forms of civilian-directed 
violence, including the direct targeting of civilians during war. 
 
Most importantly, however, this approach to terrorism brings back states as a subject for 
analysis and holds them accountable for actions that many recognise as terrorism but which 
are rarely acknowledged as terrorism, even by terrorism scholars. This is a critical task, given 
that the known effects and consequences of state terrorism —in terms of deaths, human 
suffering and material, social and political destruction—are far more serious than non-state 
terrorism. In this sense, the identifying criteria described above functions to set the limits of 
legitimate state violence, despite the frequent attempt to justify terroristic forms of violence 
by reference to doctrines of state sovereignty and the legitimate use of political violence. The 
criteria can also be used to scrutinise state practices during counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency operations to ensure that they do not morph into terrorism themselves by failing to 
distinguish between the innocent and the guilty or being highly disproportionate, for example. 
Similarly, it can be used to evaluate state practices during times of war, identifying those 
occasions when military actions go beyond strategic necessity to the use of force for the 
purpose of intimidating and demoralising civilians. 
 
In short, these criteria provide a strict set of criteria for the evaluation of actions by any and 
all actors who are in conflict. As such, they have the potential to strengthen the norms 
relating to the limits of political violence, thereby improving human and social security. 
Importantly, the broad social and academic consensus, as well as the relevant legal precepts, 
is already in place for proscribing and de-legitimising actions that fall within the categories of 
illegitimate, terrorist violence outlined above. 
 
However, in order to make this work in everyday scholarly practice, I would argue that 
terrorism scholars in particular would need to adhere to a set of core ontological, 
methodological and normative commitments. These have been outlined in detail elsewhere, 
[37] but would include, among others: 
 
• An acute sensitivity to the politics of labelling in the terrorism field and an 
acceptance of the insecure ontological status of the term; 
• Transparency about their own values and political standpoints, particularly as they 
relate to the geopolitical interests of Western states; 
• A willingness to expand their focus of research to include the use of terrorism by 
states, including Western states engaged in operations overseas; 
• Adherence to a set of responsible research ethics, including a commitment to 
refusing to cooperate with state counter-terrorism projects that include the use of 
torture, illegal practices such as rendition or the victimising of whole ―suspect 
communities‖; 
• A commitment to normative values which reject any and all forms of civilian-
directed violence and which promotes a broad notion of human security. 
 
In particular, terrorism scholars must recognise the cultural-political biases they hold and aim 
for consistency of application of the criteria set out. Specifically, they must demonstrate a 
willingness to scrutinise and condemn the actions and intentions of their own states when 
they cross the line into terrorism. This is in fact, the biggest problem facing the field in this 
area. It is not that terrorism scholars do not recognise the use of terrorism by states; it is 
rather that they limit the focus of their research largely to non-state groups that are opposed to 
Western interests and fail to acknowledge the long history of involvement of their own states 
or allied states in terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have attempted to demonstrate that even though terrorism is impossible to 
define and the study of terrorism is beset by some unhelpful biases and knowledge practices, 
it is both possible and necessary to retain the term as a focus for research. I have further 
suggested that as an analytical term, terrorism can potentially also play an important 
normative function. However, in order to realise this potential, terrorism scholars need to 
acknowledge and accept the ethico-political content of their subject and commit themselves 
to a number of transparent principles. 
 
The consequences of failing to do so are that the field remains unbalanced, politically biased 
and highly limited in its focus. More importantly, unless these imbalances are addressed, the 
field is in danger of reinforcing the view that terrorism is solely a problem of non-state 
groups and individuals, and that states are immune from condemnation or sustained scholarly 
analysis. As such, there is a danger that terrorism studies will continue to be seen by some as 
simply an arm of the state security sector and a bastion of support for the Global War on 
Terror. Considering some of the morally questionable and counter-productive policies at the 
heart of current state security practices in the global counter-terrorism campaign—such as 
extraordinary rendition, the widespread use of torture, internment at Guantanamo Bay, pre-
emptive war, extra-judicial killing of terrorist suspects, shoot-to-kill policies, intrusive 
surveillance, aid and support for authoritarian regimes and the like—this should sound a 
clarion call for concerted action to scholars in the field. 
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